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A B S T R A C T
In this paper, we investigate the effects on the economy of a feed-in tariff policy mechanism aimed to foster
investments in renewable energy production capacity. To this purpose, we employ an enriched version of the
agent-based Eurace macroeconomic model, where we have included an energy sector with a fossil-fuel power
producer as well as a renewable-energy based one. Both power producers take pricing and capacity investment
decisions based on the price of imported fossil fuel and the feed-in tariff government policy. Results show that the
feed-in tariff policy is effective in fostering the sustainability transition of the energy sector and that it increases
the level of investments with a positive impact on the unemployment rates. Moreover, we observe that its financ-
ing costs do not impact government finances, which actually improve following the better economic conditions.
For high policy intensity, however, we observe an increasing GDP share of the investment sector in the economy,
due to the building-up of renewable production capacity, with a resulting crowding out of consumption, higher
interest rates and prices. The final outcome on household well-being therefore depends on what extent the cho-
sen value judgment recognizes the importance of an economically and ecologically sustainable growth path.
1. Introduction
Sustainability transitions are long-term, multi-dimensional, and fun-
damental transformation processes that bring socio-technical systems to
shift to more sustainable modes of production and consumption. Sus-
tainability challenges can be observed in several domains, for exam-
ple, energy supply, water supply, sanitation systems, transportation sec-
tor, agriculture and food system (Geels, 2011; Gil and Beckman, 2009;
Gleick, 2003).
Focussing to the energy sector, major structural changes to the cur-
rent fossil-fuel based economic systems are needed in order to address
the challenge of climate change and economic recovery (Zysman and
Huberty, 2013). In this respect, the European Union, has displayed a se-
ries of documents to reach the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduc-
tion level necessary for staying below the politically agreed limit of 2°
temperature increase (European Commission, 2011a). The current EU
roadmap is based on the so called “20-20-20” target, i.e., a 20% reduc-
tion in GHG emissions, a 20% share of renewable energy in gross final
energy consumption and a 20% reduction in total primary energy con-
sumption for EU, by year 2020 compared to year 1990. In 2011, the
European Commission defined the long-term GHG emission reduction
target for 2050 as 80%–95% below 1990 levels in order to reach the
global political goal of staying below a 2° temperature increase (see
the “Energy Roadmap 2050”, European Commission (2011a), and the
“Roadmap Towards a Competitive Low-carbon Economy Until 2050”,
European Commission (2011b)). Moreover, two intermediate goals for
2030 have been defined in 2013: the reduction of 40% GHG emission
and 27% share of renewable energy with respect to 1990 levels, see
European Commission (2013a,b). Finally, in 2015 the critical role that
finance needs to play in enabling the resource efficient and low car-
bon transition has been discussed in Paris at the 21st Conference of the
Parties (COP21) organized by the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (McInerney and Johannsdottir, 2016;
Johannsdottir and McInerney, 2016).
These challenging goals will only be achieved with an effective Re-
newable Energy Sources (RES) support policy and with a concrete ef-
fort towards the improvement of energy efficiency. Within various re
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newable energy technologies, Photovoltaic (PV) system has become one
of the major actor in the electricity sector in Europe, and different PV
support measures have been introduced, for example capital subsidies,
VAT reduction, tax credits, quota obligation, net-metering and feed-in
tariffs (FiTs) (IEA, 2015). Each support mechanism offers both pros and
cons for the producers and the collectivity. The most diffuse PV sup-
port policy is the Feed-In Tariff (FiT) system that is considered the most
effective policy in order to stimulate the rapid development of RES
(Couture and Gagnon, 2010; Menanteau et al., 2003; Stern et al., 2006;
Butler and Neuhoff, 2008; Fouquet and Johansson, 2008). In this regard,
Mazzucato (2015) points out that the feed-in tariff (FIT) policy adopted
in Europe, e.g Italy and Germany, is a good form of public ‘patient
capital’ supporting the long-term growth of renewable energy markets,
whereas tax credits employed in the US and the UK are a form of ‘impa-
tient capital’, due to their frequent uncertainty, and which indeed has
not helped industry take-off (Porritt, 2011; Cowell, 2013).
According to the feed-in tariff policy electricity produced by RES can
be sold at guaranteed prices for fixed periods of time. These prices are
generally guaranteed by the government in a non-discriminatory man-
ner for every kWh of electricity produced, so that a large number of in-
vestors can participate, including households, landowners, farmers, mu-
nicipalities, and small business owners (Klein, 2008; Lipp, 2007).
Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), based on computable gen-
eral equilibrium, are the most common models for the analysis of cli-
mate policy and physical and socio-economic effects of climate change
(Pindyck, 2015). In a general equilibrium framework, where economies
are considered as “static, unchanging and perfectly efficient” (The
Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2014), and the eco-
nomic agents optimize their individual state and neglect external effects,
climate policies are introduced as an additional constraint leading to
less optimal (or efficient) outcomes. The overall economic costs (mainly
in terms of GDP) of climate and energy policies and how these costs can
be shared, e.g. among the member states of EU are the main important
points of discussion about sustainability (Wolf et al., 2016).
Therefore, the cost of climate mitigation can lead only to lower eco-
nomic welfare, with no room for possible long-term economic benefit.
The only possibility of not reducing welfare is if the models assume very
large damages in the future (in combination with lower discount rates).
Actually, the structural changes required to realize the transition to a
low carbon economy are beyond the horizon of standard climate policy
analysis models, and thus are the potential benefits from these changes.
In fact, the possibility that climate policy offers economic opportunities
has been largely neglected in previous macroeconomic modeling. The
economic state of the European Union, characterized by low investment
rates, low growth and high unemployment, however, suggests that there
is an urgent need for new economic opportunities. To explore such op-
portunities, Burke et al. (2016) outline the need of research progress on
climate economics, and in particular on refining the social cost of car-
bon (SCC), improving understanding of the consequences of particular
policies and better understanding of the economic impacts and policy
choices in developing economies.
The need of new approaches and tools based on complex system and
network analysis has been recently advocated by many authors, see e.g.
Battiston et al. (2016), Farmer et al. (2015), Rezai and Stagl (2016).
Agent-based modeling (ABM), already employed for the study of com-
plex systems, such as financial markets (Farmer et al., 2005; Ponta et
al., 2011b; Pastore et al., 2010; Ponta et al., 2011a, 2012) and economic
systems (Raberto et al., 2008; Dosi et al., 2010; Raberto et al., 2012;
Caiani et al., 2016; Russo et al., 2016), is an alternative approach able to
address shortcomings of IAMs because it provides a way for addressing
out-of-equilibrium dynamics in economic systems (Farmer et al., 2015).
In particular, while general equilibrium models are characterized by
rational and optimizing representative agents and by equilibrium solu-
tions subject to exogenous shocks, agent-based models are characterized
by a large number of heterogeneous and interacting agents, endowed
with adaptive expectations, and by the ensuing evolutionary macroeco-
nomic dynamics emerging from those endogenous interactions. In this
regard, it is interesting to consider the recent and comprehensive survey
by Fagiolo and Roventini (2017), where the theoretical, empirical and
political-economy pitfalls of the equilibrium approach to policy analy-
sis, in particualr the DSGE modeling framework adopted in macroeco-
nomics, are discussed and a more fruitful research approach addressing
the economy as a complex evolving system has been advocated. In par-
ticular, Fagiolo and Roventini (2017) point out the importance of tak-
ing into account the far-from-equilibrium interactions that continuously
change the structure of the economic system, i.e. what is exactly the
methodological core of agent-based computational economics, whose
successful applications to different economic domains they present and
discuss in details, including the ones on climate change economics.
The ABM framework looks indeed the appropriatemodeling ap-
proach to investigate the transition to a sustainable low carbon econ-
omy, because ABM allows the study of the sustainability transition not
as an equilibrium suboptimal solution but as a possible dynamic path
emerging from the appropriate coordination of the endogenous interac-
tions and decisions of different economic agents characterized by lim-
ited rationality and information.
A recent detailed review of the literature on complex systems, re-
lated to the climate issues, with particular attention to ABM, is pro-
vided in Balint et al. (2016), where the authors identify different ar-
eas where accounting for heterogeneity, interactions and disequilibrium
dynamics provides a complementary and novel perspective to the one
of standard equilibrium models. In particular, two early contributions
about the application of the ABM methodology to climate issues de-
serve attention: the ENGAGE model by Gerst et al. (2013) and Lagom
regiO by Wolf et al. (2013). ENGAGE is a multi-level, multi-agent, evo-
lutionary economic model, where a diverse set of agents (negotiators,
firms, and consumers) engages in purposeful behavior by observing and
interacting with their surrounding environment and other agents, and
whose purpose is to simulate the two-way dynamic feedback between
international agreements and domestic policy outcomes. Lagom regiO
is a multi-agent model of several growing economic areas in interac-
tion with the purpose to understand equilibrium selection and identify
win-win opportunities for climate policy. Both ENGAGE and Lagom re-
giO provided insights on the importance of multi-country interaction for
climate policy. On the other hand, the study presented in this paper fo-
cuses on a singe-country economy and on the fiscal costs and the macro-
economic impact of green investments subsidies.
Among more recent contributions, the papers by Safarzyńska and
van den Bergh (2016) and by Rengs et al. (2015)are worth mention-
ing. In the former study, the authors propose a formal behavioral-evolu-
tionary macroeconomic model populated by heterogeneous consumers,
producers, power plants and banks, interacting through interconnected
networks, and examine how decisions by all these economic agents af-
fect financial stability, the direction of technological change and en-
ergy use. In Rengs et al. (2015), the authors propose a macroeco-
nomic multi-agent model with agents that change the behavior associ-
ated with carbon-intensive goods to test the effect of various policies
on both environmental and economic performance. Furthermore, be-
sides agent-based modeling, the use of other approaches encompassing
out-of-equilibrium dynamics in economic systems to investigate the cli-
mate change and relative economic policies is worth mentioning. In this
respect, Monasterolo and Raberto (2018) propose the EIRIN flow-fund
behavioral model with heterogeneous agents as a tool to simulate green
fiscal and targeted monetary policies, displaying their effects on firms'
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growth. Jackson and Victor (2015) develop a system dynamics
macro-economic model for describing financial assets and liabilities in
a stock-flow consistent Framework (FALSTAFF) and use this model to
explore the potential for stationary state outcomes in an economy with
balanced trade, credit creation by banks, and private equity. Then, this
model has been enriched developing a socio-economic sustainability
transition in order to analyze the economic, ecological and financial as-
pects (Jackson et al., 2015).
In this paper, we address the question on how to foster the rebuild-
ing of the energy system with the aim of reaching a low carbon econ-
omy, and whether rebuilding the energy system has the potential to trig-
ger a sustainability transition towards an economically and ecologically
sustainable growth path. In this respect, abstracting from the obvious
improvements in GHG emissions, we aim to assess the trade-off between
the fiscal economic costs of financing a transition to a renewable and
fossil-fuels free energy system and the benefits of reducing substantially
fossil fuels imports, in particular in the long term. Our goal is to devise
the better policy combination that improves the long-term benefits with
respect to the short-term costs for the macroeconomy as a whole. Fi-
nally, it is worth remarking that the current study ignores the biophys-
ical impact of the sustainability transition on the environment, but fo-
cuses only on its financial and economic implications. In order to inves-
tigate the macroeconomic effects of the sustainability transition in the
energy sector, we employ and enrich the agent-based macroeconomic
model and simulator Eurace as it will be outlined in the following sec-
tion (Cincotti et al., 2010, 2012a,b; Raberto et al., 2012, 2014; Teglio et
al., 2012, 2015).
Computational results show that the feed-in tariff mechanism is
clearly able to foster accumulation of renewable energy production ca-
pacity and then to increase the share of renewable energy production.
The impact of the financing costs on the economy, through the higher
tax burden, is limited to the highest values of the feed-in tariffs and
characterized by reduced consumption levels at the expense of a higher
share of the investment sector on GDP, due to the increasing weight of
green investments on the economy. The impact on the unemployment
rate is generally positive, in particular if compared with the case where
no feed-in tariff policy is adopted.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the main en-
richments made to the Eurace model in order to address the issue of the
sustainability transition in the energy sector, Section 3 shows the results
of the computational experiments and, finally, Section 4 provides our
concluding remarks.
2. Modeling the Sustainability Transition in Eurace
2.1. Overview of the Eurace Model
The model presented in this paper is an enrichment of the macro-
economic agent-based simulator Eurace (Cincotti et al., 2010, 2012a,b;
Raberto et al., 2012, 2014; Teglio et al., 2012, 2015). The baseline Eu-
race originally included the following agents: households (HHs), acting
as workers, consumers and financial investors; consumption goods pro-
ducers (CGPs), which are firms producing a homogenous consumption
good; a capital goods producer (KGP), commercial banks (Bs) and two
policy makers, namely a government (G) and a central bank (CB), in
charge of fiscal and monetary policy, respectively. To address the is-
sue of the sustainability transition in the energy sector, the following
agents have been included in the model: a fossil-fuels based electricity
company, which imports fossil fuels and produces electricity with de-
creasing returns to scale, a renewable-source based (e.g. solar or wind
power) electricity producer, which invests in renewable technology sub-
ject to government sustainability policy, and a fossil-fuels exporting for-
eign economy. The new agents interact on a monthly basis with the orig-
inal agents through the (newly introduced) electricity market.
Fig. 1 shows a graphical representation of the present Eurace model
in terms of agent classes (ellipses or rectangles) and current account
monetary flows (arrows). Rectangles are used when just one instance of
the class is considered in the model, whereas ellipses are intended to
represent the presence of multiple heterogeneous instances of the agent
class. The yellow background refers to newly introduced agents. The ar-
rows represent the current account flows reported in the upper part of
the transaction flow matrix, i.e. Table A3 in Appendix A.
Eurace agents interact through different decentralized markets for
consumption and capital goods, labor, housing and credit, where dis-
perse prices are set by suppliers and based on costs. Two centralized
Walrasian market exist: a financial market for firms/banks' stocks and
government bonds and the newly introduced electricity market.
Agents' behavior is myopic and characterized by bounded rational-
ity, backward-looking adaptive expectations, and limited capabilities of
computation and information gathering. In particular, agents' behavior
follows adaptive rules derived from the management literature about
firms and banks, and from experimental economics literature about the
behavior of consumers and financial investors. For instance, CGPs (i)
make short-term production plans based on past sales and present in-
ventory stocks, along the lines of the inventory management literature
(Hillier and Lieberman, 1986) ; (ii) follow mark-up pricing on unit costs,
see e.g. Plott and Sunder (1982), Fabiani et al. (2006), where costs are
given by wages, debt interests and electricity; (iii) plan investments ac-
cording to net present value calculations, i.e. discounting expected fu-
ture revenues at their weighted average cost of capital; (iv) follow the
pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) for financing decisions.
Households make their consumption/saving decisions with the aim
to accumulate a target stock of liquid wealth, determined as a multiple
of their income, to be used as a buffer in cases of income downfalls,
according to the theory of buffer-stock saving (Carroll, 2001; Deaton,
1992). Savings can be allocated in stocks (i.e. the claims on firms/banks
equity and future dividends) and government bonds. Households also
buy and sell housing units in an appropriate market, which opens on a
monthly basis, and finance entirely⁠1 house purchases by means of mort-
gages granted by banks.
Banks provide short-term loans to firms and long-term mortgages
to households at interest rates determined by the cost of central bank
loans, i.e. the central bank policy rate, plus a markup. According to the
modus operandi of the banking system in a modern capitalist economy,
see e.g. McLeay et al. (2014), banks lending in the Eurace model is not
limited by the available liquidity and, whenever a bank grants a loan or
a mortgage, a corresponding deposit, entitled to the borrower, is created
on the liability side of the bank’ balance sheet. If a bank becomes short
of liquidity, it canget a loan from the central bank which provide liquid-
ity to the banking system in infinite supply. In line with the post-Keyne-
sian literature, see e.g. Fontana (2003); Godley and Lavoie (2012), we
then follow the endogenous moneymodeling approach, where loans cre-
ate deposits, not the other way around. Bank lending is however lim-
ited by a Basel II-like capital requirement rule; in this respect, each
bank assesses the credit risk by considering the financial leverage of the
prospective borrower before deciding about a credit request.
A detailed description of agents' behavior and interactions in the
different markets for the original baseline Eurace model is provided in
Teglio et al. (2015) . Details about the Eurace housing market are pro-
vided in Ozel et al. (2016).
Finally, a distinctive feature of the Eurace modeling approach is that
every agent is modeled through a double-entry balance sheet that in-
cludes the details of all assets and liabilities. The dynamical change
1 This feature has been assumed in order to separate household consumption/saving
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Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the present Eurace model in terms of agent classes (ellipses or rectangles) and current account monetary flows (arrows). Rectangles are used when just
one instance of the class is considered in the model, whereas ellipses are intended to represent the presence of multiple heterogeneous instances of the agent class. The yellow background
refers to newly introduced agents.
of balance sheet variables depends on agents' plan and on the result
of agents’ interaction within the different market settings. A complete
and compact structural description of all Eurace agents and sectors is
provided in Appendix A by Tables A1, A2, A3 and A4, where we have
highlighted the stock-flow consistency of the model, according to the
methodology described by Godley and Lavoie (2012) and along the lines
of post-Keynesian economics, see Caverzasi and Godin (2015) . The ta-
bles highlight a set of relevant identities that need to be taken into ac-
count to check for the consistency between stocks and flows in the sim-
ulated data.
2.2. New Features: The Energy Sector
In order to investigate how to foster the sustainability transition in
the energy sector, a feed-in-tariff system is considered. A feed-in tar-
iff mechanism is a policy mechanism designed to accelerate investment
in renewable energy technologies (Couture and Gagnon, 2010). The
feed-in-tariff system usually has three components:
• A fixed price for a fixed amount of years (long-term contract),
• Grid priority to electricity produced by renewable energy (meaning
renewable energy will be bought first),
• Financing costs covered by a mix of a reallocation charge τ⁠E, paid only
by electricity consumers, and general taxation.
The feed-in tariff mechanism is modeled in Eurace in a similar way.
In particular, we postulate that the renewable energy producer is en-
titled to sell electricity at a feed-in tariff , assumed constant and
guaranteed forever by the government. The value is set exogenously
and is the parameter characterizing our experiments. The difference be-
tween the feed-in-tariff price and the market electricity price p⁠E, paid
by electricity consumers, is paid by the government by using its general
tax revenues⁠2.
Two types of electricity producers, i.e. a fossil-fuel based one, hence-
forth PP, and a renewable-source based one, henceforth RP, have been
included, along with a fossil-fuels exporting foreign country, hence-
forth foreign economy (FE). In particular, the renewable electricity
producer uses renewable technology, say solar panels or wind tur-
bines, to produce electricity that will be sold to electricity consumers
2 In order to investigate the system behavior at high feed-in tariffs (relative to the
electricity market price) and then huge financing costs, our experiments have been
designed with τ⁠E set to zero, then considering feed-in tariff costs always fully financed by
general taxation, to better distribute the burden on a broader fiscal base and then avoid
too high electricity surcharges.
(firms), whereas the non-renewable electricity producer employs fossil
fuel imported from the foreign economy to produce the residual de-
manded quantity, as we assume that renewable energy has priority in
the market.
Both PP and PP are characterized by a balance sheet, described in
Table A1, in the same way of the other agents. In particular, both PP and
RP are characterized by liquidity M in the assets side and by equity E in
the liabilities side. Moreover, the RP is also characterized by a capital
endowment, say the number of solar panels (or wind turbines) installed,
n⁠sp, in the assets side and by debt D in the liabilities side. As the solar
panels (or wind turbines) are identified as capital goods in the model,
they are produced domestically by the capital goods producer that em-
ploys labor force as production factor.
2.2.1. Electricity Demand
Electricity is demanded by consumption goods producers (CGPs) on
a monthly basis. Firms need electricity, as it is a non-substitutable pro-
duction factor, in addition to labor and capital, that any firm f employs
to produce the monthly amount of output qCf. To this purpose, we con-
sider now a production function characterized by a nested Cobb-Dou-
glas and Leontief technology where the usual Cobb-Douglas production
function, characterized by labor N and capital K inputs (see Eq. 8 of
Teglio et al., 2015), is coupled with a third non-substitutable input, i.e.
the amount of electricity qEf, as follows:
(1)
where η⁠E is the electricity efficiency parameter (supposed uniform across
firms), which gives the amount of output per unit of electricity.
We assume that electricity is immediately delivered to CGPs by one
of the two electricity producers and that firms are never rationed in
their demand for electricity. Electricity demand (and consumption) qEf
is then given for any firm f by its output qCf as follows:
(2)
Aggregate demand (and consumption) of electricity is then given by
∑fqEf.
2.2.2. Renewable Power Producer (RP)
Renewable energy comprises a heterogeneous class of technologies,
among which bioenergy, solar energy, hydro-power, geothermal en-
ergy, ocean energy and wind energy. We focus in this paper on the
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2015 renewable capacity in place was enough to supply an estimated
23.7% of global electricity⁠3.
The Renewable Producer (RP) described in this section employs
physical capital units (say solar panels, wind turbines, hydropower tur-
bines, geothermal power stations) in order to produce electricity from
a renewable source. The RP designed in the model is quite generic and
could represent a wide range of technologies; however, for the sake of
conciseness, we use solar energy as the preferential narrative for the
paper. In this perspective, RP employs solar panels, built and sold by
the capital goods producer (KGP). The level of production of renewable
electricity depends on the number of solar panels installed, n⁠sp, as fol-
lows:
(3)
where qEsp is the amount of electricity supplied on a monthly basis by
any single solar panel. The number of installed solar panels is the cu-
mulative result of monthly investment decision, Δn⁠sp, made by the re-
newable producer RP. The investment decision is based on a Net Present
Value (NPV) calculation, which assesses if the (discounted) expected fu-
ture cash flows given by the additional electricity sales are larger than
the initial investment cost in the solar panel infrastructure, i.e.,
(4)
where p⁠sp is the price of a single solar panel, r is the yearly average cost
of capital for the RP and m represents the index of months. Assuming no
particular risk for the renewable electricity production, the yearly aver-
age cost of capital r is equal to the interest rate set by the central bank.
Furthermore, assuming the feed-in tariff constant over time, consid-
ering that q⁠E,spΔn⁠sp is constant as well (we assume that solar panels are
not subject to wear), and using the well-known properties of geometric
series, Eq. (4) can be written as:
(5)
It is worth noting that at the current state of technology, the average
life span of a photovoltaic panel is guaranteed by producers to be in the
range from 20 to 30 years, see e.g. Bastidas-Rodríguez et al. (2015) and
the fact sheets provided by large producers. Therefore, the assumption
of no degradation for newly acquired solar panels is consistent with the
time span of our simulations, set to 20 years.
Eq. (4) points out that, given the costs of solar panels, the discounted
expected revenues from selling the electricity at the feed-in-tariff price
determine if the NPV is positive or negative, and therefore if an in-
vestment to acquire additional solar panels should be made. If NPV is
positive, the investment is undertaken and new solar panels are pur-
chased from the capital goods producer. It is worth noting that, as the
NPV increases linearly and monotonically with Δn⁠sp, the size of invest-
ments should be as large as possible depending on the financing possi-
bilities. To consider the most conservative case regarding the accumula-
tion of renewable production capacity, we postulate that the size of in-
vestment Δn⁠sp is limited by the liquidity M⁠RP available to the renewable
power producer, i.e. Δn⁠sp = M⁠RP/p⁠sp, where p⁠sp is the monthly unit price
of solar panels. Therefore, we assume that RP is not allowed to take debt
to finance investments, which are instead financed by internal financial
resources only, i.e. by retained earnings.
3 See for instance the “Renewables 2016 Global Status Report” by REN21, http://www.
ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/REN21_GSR2016_FullReport_en_11.pdf.
Investment in new solar panels and production of electricity occur
sequentially, during the same day at the beginning of each month. New
solar panels are immediately delivered to the RP agent by the KGP and
employed for the production of electricity.
Table A1 presents the balance sheet of the RP agent. All bal-
ance-sheet entries are updated on a monthly basis. In particular, phys-
ical capital is given by the number n⁠sp of solar panels installed, which
takes into account new acquisitions Δn⁠sp; liquidity M⁠RP changes accord-
ing to RP’ cash flows⁠4, i.e., investment cost p⁠spΔn⁠sp and electricity sales
as follows:
(6)
where revenues shall be considered equal to profits, as no op-
erating costs are assumed for the renewable power producer, but just
capital costs. Finally, equity E⁠RP (net worth) is calculated according to
the usual accounting rule:
(7)
We assume that the RP equity capital is divided equally among house-
holds; however, the agent does not pay out dividends and retains all its
profits in order to increase the liquidity available for investments.
2.2.3. Power Producer (PP)
The power producer (PP) agent produces electricity using a non-re-
newable energy source, say oil, according to a production function char-
acterized by decreasing returns to scale, as follows:
(8)
where q⁠O is the oil input amount and γ⁠E and β⁠E are positive parameters.
In particular, β⁠E is the electricity production elasticity, while γ⁠E is sim-
ply a production scale factor. Table 1reports the values assigned to these
parameters in our simulations.
We characterize the non-renewable electricity producer with de-
creasing returns to scale to replicate the realistic setting of an aggre-
gate electricity supply curve which is the result of aggregating the sin-
gle supplies of different producers. In particular, the aim is to mimic
an electricity wholesale market where the market price is set at the
marginal price, i.e. at the intersection of aggregate supply and demand
curves (Borenstein, 2000, Somani and Tesfatsion, 2008). In the real
market setting, market supply is aggregated over each single produc-
er's supply, each characterized by different technologies/non-renewable
sources and then different unit costs. In that setting, the aggregate sup-
ply curve is upward sloping in the usual quantity/price plan, with rising
unit costs that emerge by construction.
On the other hand, renewable electricity production is characterized
by negligible operational costs, compared to the non-renewable case,
and by capital costs (e.g. photovoltaic panels and land in the case of so-
lar energy) which can be considered as essentially linear with respect
to the amount of electricity produced. These technological and market
setting considerations justify the difference between themodeling of the
non-renewable and the renewable electricity production sectors.
Clearly, this realistic difference is in principle an advantage for the
renewable production technology, in particular for increasing electric
4 It is worth noting that the RP agent does not bear direct electricity production costs
for the very nature of green electricity production technology, whereas negative cash flows
are given only by investment costs. Furthermore, the grid priority foreseen by the feed-in
tariff policy implies that all the electricity produced by the renewable power producer is
sold, because the renewable producer does not compete with the non-renewable one for











L. Ponta et al. Ecological Economics xxx (2017) xxx-xxx
Table 1
Relevant parameters values used in the simulation.
Symbol Parameter Value
η⁠E Electricity efficiency 1.0 u.c.g./GWh
Feed-in-tariff [0.09–0.5] E€
qEsp Quantity of electricity produced by a single
solar panel
0.2 GWh
k⁠E Electricity efficiency coefficient 1.0
β⁠E Electricity production elasticity 0.9
γ⁠E Electricity production scale factor 1.0
p⁠O Oil price 0.0035 E€
μ⁠E Markup 10%
τ⁠E Reallocation charge 0.0
δ⁠E Percentage increase in electricity demand
estimation
10%
ity demand. However, it is worth noting that in the range of values of
calibration of the model, non-renewable electricity production is usually
more convenient, as showed by the very low renewable investments for
the lowest feed-in tariff value or even no investments at all in the case
of no policy adopted.
The PP buys oil abroad, i.e. from a representative agent of a foreign
economy, say Foreign Economy (FE) agent. As we assume that the RP
has priority in the power grid, the quantity of electricity qEPP that the PP
will sell during the month is set as a residual between the aggregate de-
mand of electricity, ∑fqEf, and the supply provided by the RP, qERP, i.e.,
(9)
It is worth noting that the aggregate demand of electricity, ∑fqEf, is un-
known at the beginning of the month because electricity is demanded
by firms at their activation day, i.e. the day of production planning and
execution, which are different across firms, see Teglio et al. (2015) for
further details. However, at the beginning of each month the PP agent
has to set the electricity price p⁠E that will be valid for the rest of the
month and will be taken into account by firms for their production plan-
ning cost assessment. To this purpose, as the price of electricity p⁠E is
set by the PP according to a mark-up on unit costs, the power producer
needs to estimate in advance its incoming month production/sales, say
qEPP, and related unit costs ĉE. The estimate is based on the electricity
sold in the previous month increased by percentage amount, say δ⁠E, to
take into account a possible demand increase.
Given the estimate qEPP and the production technology set by Eq. (8),
the quantity of oil that would be necessary to meet the production
plan is given by
(10)
Then, the PP, estimates the unit costs ĉE that are equal to
(11)
where p⁠O is the oil price set by the foreign economy. Accordingly, the
PP sets the electricity price p⁠E as:
(12)
where μ⁠E is a fixed markup and τ⁠E is the reallocation charge⁠5, whose
value depends on the policy adopted. It is worth noting that the unit
cost, and therefore the price, increases with the estimated electricity
production/sales qEPP because 1/β⁠E − 1 > 0.
The revenues of the PP are evaluated at the end of each month by
summing up the effective quantity of electricity sold during the month,
i.e. qEPP set by Eq. 11, at the market price p⁠E. Costs are given by the ef-
fective amount of oil imported q⁠O paid at price p⁠O, where
(13)
Profits are then given by qEPPpE − qOpO and, if positive, are paid out to
shareholders as dividends.
Table A1 presents the balance sheet of the PP. Liquidity M⁠PP is up-
dated monthly following PP profits. Equity E⁠PP is also updated once a
month at the beginning of the month according to the usual accounting
rule and then set equal to liquidity M⁠PP, as no debt liability is foreseen
for the PP agent in our model.
2.2.4. Feed-in Tariff Policy Costs
Since the renewable power producer is remunerated by the feed-in
tariff value for each unit of renewable energy sold, whereas firms
pay the market price p⁠E, where , the difference is financed by the
government through general taxation. The monthly feed-in tariff policy
costs can then be quantified by the difference between the two prices,
times the monthly amount of electricity qERP sold by the renewable elec-
tricity producer, i.e. .
2.2.5. Foreign Economy
The Foreign Economy (FE) is a stylized agent that works as provider
of the oil that the PP needs in order to produce electricity. The FE sets
the oil price and receives the oil export payments which are accumu-
lated as liquidity. The FE balance sheet is simply characterized by a liq-
uidity entry on the asset side and the corresponding net worth (Equity)
on the liabilities side.
2.2.6. Calibration
Ranges of recent costs of energy for commercially available RE tech-
nologies are wide, and depend on several factors, including technology
characteristics, regional variations in cost and performance, and differ-
ing discount rates. Some RE technologies are already competitive with
existing market energy prices, while many of the other RE technologies
can provide competitive energy services in certain circumstances, for ex-
ample, in regions with favorable resource conditions. In most regions of
the world, policy measures are still required to ensure rapid deployment
of many RE sources ⁠6. In order to fine-tune costs and performance of the
energy variables in the model, we referred to the Italian industrial sec-
tor, as explained in the next paragraphs.
We consider the Italian economy as reference for calibration be-
cause it represents an advanced economy that is highly dependent on
imports for its energy needs. This choice is consistent with the design
of the energy sector in Eurace, where the non-renewable energy pro-
duction depends on fossil fuels imported from the foreign sector. We
5 The reallocation charge is a surcharge on the electricity price aimed to finance the
feed-in tariff scheme together with general taxation, as pointed out in Section 2.2. It is
worth noting, however, that in this paper we investigate the case where the feed-in tariff
policy is financed only by general taxation, therefore the reallocation charge is set to zero,
as specified in Table 1 where the values of the energy sector parameters are reported.
6 See the 2012 “Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change
Mitigation”, published for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for
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address a foreign dependent energy sector not just because it is a com-
mon and realisticfeature of most advanced economies but in particular
because it allows to take into account the long-term economic benefits
of decreasing fossil fuels imports due to domestic investments in renew-
able energy.
The monthly electricity q⁠E,sp supplied by a single solar panel as
well as its unit cost p⁠sp have been calibrated to values consistent with
the size of the other Eurace economic variables, considering real so-
lar panel costs and performance. The average cost (including installa-
tion) of a solar panel of power 1 kW has been reported⁠7 to be around
5000 €, whereas, at the present state of the art of technology, its aver-
age monthly performance could be approximated to be 100 kWh.
In order to put the above numbers in the context of Eurace, we de-
vised a sort of equivalence between the Euro (€) and the currency unit
used in Eurace, let's call it the Eurace Euro (E€). For this purpose, con-
sidering that in Italy there are around 30 million of families (house-
holds) with a net monthly labor income at around 1500 € per fam-
ily, and that the computational experiments have been performed with
3000 households with an initial money wage set to be 1.5 E€, the equiv-
alence between the euro and the Eurace euro has been obtained by





In our model design, solar panels are identified with the capital
goods units, whose initial unit cost is set to be 1 E€; therefore, we
need to characterize the Eurace solar panel with a monthly performance
consistent with its high initial cost, i.e. 10 million Euro, as stated by
Eq. (15). As a real solar panel, characterized by 1 kW of power and a
monthly performance of 100 kW, is valued at around 5000 €, we assume
that the Eurace solar panel is equivalent to 2000 real solar panel and,
accordingly, is characterized by a power 2 MW and a monthly perfor-
mance q⁠sp = 200 MWh, i.e. 0.2 GWh. Moreover, it is worth noting that,
as we identify solar panels with regular capital goods, the equivalence
between the price of an Eurace solar panel unit (p⁠sp) and the price of
capital goods p⁠K, will hold for the entire duration of the simulation.
Furthermore, we have set electricity demand and market prices sim-
ilar to the one observed in a reference country, say Italy. According
to Terna⁠8, the monthly electricity consumption of the Italian industrial
sector is around 10,000 GWh; therefore, considering that, with the pa-
rameters used for the production sector, see Teglio et al. (2015) , the
monthly aggregate production capacity of 50 CGPs in Eurace is around
10,000 units of consumption goods (u.c.g.), then according to Eq. (2),
the electricity efficiency η⁠E of each CGP has been set to 1.0 u.c.g./GWh.
According to GME⁠9, the order of magnitude of the electricity mar-
ket price is tens of €/MWh, i.e. centimes of E€/GWh; therefore, accord-
ing to Eqs. (7)–(11), we have set the electricity production function pa-
rameters, γ⁠E and β⁠E, as well as the price of oil, here assumed constant
and equal to 0.0035 E€, to values consistent with the monthly electric-
ity production of 10,000 GWh at a unit cost around 0.01 E€/GWh.
Finally, it is worth noting that with the calibration here described,





Fig. 9c, then consistent with the ratio observed in the reference country
considered⁠10.
3. Computational Results
The methodology of the study is based on Monte Carlo compu-
tational experiments, consistingof running simulations with different
seeds of the pseudorandom number generator for each scenario. Six
feed-in tariff electricity price scenarios along with a no policy scenario,
and 50 seeds per scenario, for a total of 350 simulations have been con-
sidered. Simulations have been performed ceteris paribus, meaning that
all the parameters are identical across the different policy scenarios,
with the exception of the feed-in tariff, i.e. , whose value character-
izes the policy rule of a specific scenario. In particular, the feed-in tariff
price is taken as an exogenous parameter that assumes six values, i.e.
0.09, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5 E€. The value 0.09 has been verified to be
close to the threshold under which, given the NPV investment rule and
the order of magnitude of the parameters and the variables of the sys-
tem, there are only negligible investments in new solar panels. On the
contrary, in the no policy scenario, the renewable power producer has
still grid priority but no subsidized feed-in tariff is foreseen, there-
fore, the RP agent is able to sell electricity only at the endogenous mar-
ket price p⁠E.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values related to the newly intro-
duced energy sector. The parameter values of the original Eurace model
can be retrieved in Teglio et al. (2015), whereas in Ozel et al. (2016)
one can find the housing market parameters. Simulations cover a ficti-
tious time span of twenty years. The Figures from (2) to (8) present a
series of boxplots showing, for the no policy case and for every value
of the feed-in tariff considered, the distribution of 28 relevant economic
variables over the 50 seeds used to initialize the pseudo-random num-
ber generator. In particular, boxplots show the distribution of the time
averages over the entire 20 years long time span, related to any of the
50 seeds (simulations). Boxes include all the values from the 25th to
the 75th percentile, the red horizontal segments and the blue diamond
markers represent the median and the mean of the distribution, respec-
tively. Boxplots also include whiskers extending to the most extreme
data points not considered outliers, whereas outliers, if any, are plot-
ted individually. The value of the mean of the distribution, along with
the standard error (in round bracket), are reported in the Appendix in
Table C1, whereas Table C2 reports for any of the 28 economic vari-
ables the average over the 50 seeds of the coefficient of variation. It is
worth noting that for each seed, the coefficient of variation is computed
as the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean, both over
time. Tables 2 and 3 present the two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test with
the aim to test the null hypothesis that data samples referred to two dif-
ferent feed-in tariffs are drawn from continuous distributions with equal
medians, against the alternative that they are not, see e.g. Gibbons and
Chakraborti (2011). In particular, in Table 2, the no policy sample is
tested against the samples related to each feed-in tariff value considered,
whereas Table 3 tests samples referred to two consecutive feed-in tariffs.
Both tables report the p-value of the test; therefore, values lower than
0.05 (0.01) signal that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% (1%)
significance level. Finally, Table 4 reports the results of the test for the
unemployment rate variable for all the possible combinations of the no
policy case and the feed-in tariff values.
Fig. 2 shows that the feed-in tariff policy adopted is very effective
to spur investments in renewable energy production capacity. This re-
sult is clearly evident when one observes how the distribution of the
number of installed solar panels and, correspondingly, of renewable en
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Fig. 2. The Figure presents a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tariff, , considered and the no policy case, the distribution of the number of solar panels installed,
n⁠sp (a), the share of renewable energy (b), the monthly electricity market price, p⁠E (c) and the general tax rate (d) over the 50 seeds of the simulation. The values in the range represented
by the boxplots refer to time averages over 20 years for each one of the 50 seeds.
ergy production capacity (as a percentage of total production) change
with respect to the feed-in price value and the no policy case. In particu-
lar, we can observe how both the median value (red line) and the mean
(blue diamond) of the distribution clearly increase with the feed-in tar-
iff, whereas the relative position of the box edges, which delimitate the
25th and 75th percentiles, indicates a clear difference between the out-
comes related to two consecutive feed-in tariff values considered. Both
Tables 2 and 3 show that the null hypothesis of samples derived from
the same population is rejected at the 1% significance level. Further-
more, in the no policy case, we do not observe any new investments in
solar panels and the level of units installed remains at its initial level,
i.e. 500, see Table C1.
Panel (c) of Fig. 2 shows how the policy affects the distribution of
electricity market prices, whose values decrease for high values of the
feed-in tariff . This happens because higher feed-in tariffs lead to
more renewable capacity and consequently less electricity produced by
means of fossil fuels, which in turn implies lower unit costs/market
prices for electricity due to the decreasing returns to scale of power pro-
duction based on fossil fuels. Statistical tests, see Tables 2 and 3, con-
firm that the difference is statistically significant. Finally, panel d of
Fig. 2 reports the distribution of average tax rates. It is worth remem-
bering that the government budget finances the difference between the
revenues of the RP agent, which are based on the feed-in tariff , and
the amount paid by electricity consumers, which is evaluated at the
market price p⁠E, where . Therefore, it is important to investigate
how fiscal policy (tax rates), which is stick to the usual 3% deficit tar
geting rule, is affected by the additional feed-in tariff financing costs.
Panel d and statistical tables show that there is a significant impact on
average tax rates only at the highest considered values of , whereas
for lower values of the feed-in tariff the impact is limited, in particular
if we consider the median value which increases only for the maximum
value assumed by .
Furthermore, in Fig. 2 (d) we can observe a particular shape of the
boxplot distribution, where for most feed-in tariffs the median (the red
line) corresponds to the upper edge of the box and, consistently, the
mean (the blue point) is significantly lower. Therefore, the evidence of
this Figure points out that about half of points are grouped around the
median, whereas there is a significant number of “outliers” of much
lower value that displaces the mean with respect to the median. To this
regard, it is worth remembering that the frequency of tax rate update by
the government is yearly, i.e. lower than the usual monthly frequency
of other variables; moreover, the tax rate change is most often slug-
gish as no change at all occurs with respect to the previous year level
if the government yearly deficit stays within the (0, −3%) bounds, see
Teglio et al. (2015) for further details. Therefore, we argue that the
lower update frequency of the tax rate along with its sluggishnessex-
plains the characteristic data distribution observed in the figure; in par-
ticular, what happens is that if the tax rate is lowered during a simu-
lation, then the simulation time span is not sufficient to allow it to re-
turn to its say long-term mean value due to its low update frequency
and sluggish change dynamics. However, it is worth noting that the
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Table 2
p-Values of the two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test, under the null hypothesis that the two samples are selected from Populations having the same distribution. The test has been performed
between the no policy sample data and the data referred to each feed-in tariff considered. Values lower than 0.05 (0.01) signal that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% (1%) signifi-
cance level.
Variables 0.09 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
n⁠sp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Share renewable energy (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p⁠E(E€/GWh) 0.055 0.058 0.789 0.000 0.000 0.000
Yearly tax rates (%) 0.234 0.130 0.823 0.810 0.636 0.000
Employment rate CGP (%) 0.070 0.001 0.011 0.185 0.315 0.000
Employment rate KGP (%) 0.052 0.718 0.438 0.007 0.000 0.000
Unemploymnet rate (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nominal wage (E€) 0.003 0.025 0.150 0.005 0.000 0.000
p⁠C (E€) 0.004 0.071 0.221 0.004 0.000 0.000
p⁠K(E€) 0.001 0.008 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000
Δp⁠C/p⁠C (%) 0.002 0.015 0.143 0.003 0.000 0.000
Δp⁠K/p⁠K (%) 0.000 0.004 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000
Yearly real consumption 0.012 0.006 0.002 0.162 0.392 0.000
Yearly real investments 0.023 0.602 0.284 0.004 0.000 0.000
Real consumption growth rate (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.363 0.001
Real investments growth rate (%) 0.792 0.857 0.608 0.004 0.000 0.000
K⁠F 0.028 1.000 0.973 0.915 0.836 0.136
ΔK⁠F/K⁠F (%) 0.022 0.319 0.644 0.763 0.303 0.708
D⁠F (E€) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ΔD⁠F/D⁠F (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CB policy rate (%) 0.014 0.003 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.000
Government bond yield (%) 0.293 0.414 0.668 0.190 0.000 0.000
Government debt/GDP (%) 0.003 0.139 0.061 0.287 0.872 0.931
Government budget/GDP (%) 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.015 0.056
Feed-in tariff policy cost/GDP (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Feed-in tariff policy cost/Tax (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Oil import costs/GDP (%) 0.005 0.111 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000
Electricity cost CGPs/GDP (%) 0.006 0.158 0.218 0.002 0.000 0.000
to neglect these statistical fluctuations since the statistical tests, see
Tables 2 and 3, point out that the tax rate is not statistically different
over the different feed-in tariffs except for the highest value of the in-
centivized electricity price .
Figures from (3) to (6) aim to assess the impact of the feed-in tariff
policy on the real economy and in particular on the labor, consumption
goods and capital goods markets. For this purpose, we employ again
the boxplot representation to show how the distribution over 50 seeds
of the time averages of relevant economic variables changes with re-
spect to the feed-in tariff. In particular, we consider the employment
rates, real consumption and investment levels, and prices. Fig. 3 shows
that high feed-in tariffs have a clear impact on the employment rate
in the capital goods production sector (panel b), as also confirmed by
the statistical tables. In particular, we observe that a larger demand for
solar panels, due to higher , determines higher employment rates at
the solar panel supplier, i.e., the capital goods producer (KGP). The up-
ward slope that we can observe inFig. 3 (b) for E€ is statistically rel-
evant with respect to both the no policy case⁠11and with respect to the sce-
narios characterized by lower values of the feed-in tariff⁠12 This is not a sur-
prising outcome, indeed, but it is worth to point out that the produc-
tion of more solar panels creates a sort of crowding out effect on thela-
bor market as it can be observed that, while the employment rate at
the KGP agent increases, the employments rate at the CGPs decreases
(panel a). The downwards slope of the CGPs employment rate is statisti-
cally relevant only for the two highest value of , i.e. 0.4 E€ and 0.5 E€,
11 As regards, the KGP employment rate distribution, Table 2 reports p-values lower than
1% for E€
12 Table 3shows p-values lower than 1% for the KGP employment rate when we compare the
scenario E€ with the one E€, and the scenario E€ with the one
E€.
seeTable 3. This evidence suggests a moderately positive net effect on the to-
tal employment rate. This is in fact the graphical evidence we can observe in
panel c ofFig. 3, where the total unemployment rate is displayed. In partic-
ular, a graphical inspection points out a much higher unemployment rate in
the no policy case, i.e. in the absence of green investments, and a decreas-
ing trend of the unemployment mean and median for increasing values of
the feed-in tariff. It is worth noting that this difference in the distribution of
the unemployment rate is statistically significant at the 1% significance level,
both when we compare the no policy case with all the feed-in tariff scenarios,
seeTable 2, and when we compare the cases with the highest values, i.e.,
0.4 and 0.5, with the cases with the lowest ones, i.e. E€, seeTable 4.
On the other hand, this sort of crowding out effect of solar panel pro-
duction has a fairly negligible negative impact on the capital accumu-
lation of firms, whose capital endowment levels and growth rates look
pretty stable across the values of , see Fig. 6,panels (a) and (b). Statis-
tical tests confirm that the small differences between the boxplot distri-
butions are not statistically significant, see Tables 2 and 3.
Lower unemployment for high feed-in tariffsleads to an increase of
the nominal wage level (panel d) because of the higher pressure⁠13 on
the labor market. Higher wages imply higher general unit production
costs and then higher prices both for consumption and capital goods,
as observed accordingly in Fig. 4. However, unit costs of CGPs depend
also on capital goods prices as well as on interest rates, which increase
at high , see Fig. 7, then consumption goods prices increase more
than nominal wages, as we can figure out by comparing Fig. 3 (d) with
13 If firms have difficulties in increasing the labor force, then they raise their wage offer.











L. Ponta et al. Ecological Economics xxx (2017) xxx-xxx
Table 3
p-Values of the two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test, under the null hypothesis that the two samples are selected from Populations having the same distribution. The test have been performed
between samples referred to two consecutive feed-in tariffs, for each of the 28 economic variables examined. Values lower than 0.05 (0.01) signal that the null hypothesis is rejected at
the 5% (1%) significance level.
Variables 0.09 vs 0.1 0.1 vs 0.2 0.2 vs 0.3 0.3 vs 0.4 0.4 vs 0.5
n⁠sp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Share renewable energy (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p⁠E(E€/GWh) 0.872 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000
Yearly tax rates (%) 0.585 0.155 0.965 0.465 0.001
Employment rate CGP (%) 0.025 0.293 0.319 0.020 0.000
Employment rate KGP (%) 0.042 0.664 0.041 0.001 0.000
Unemploymnet rate (%) 0.181 0.226 0.072 0.074 0.236
Nominal wage (E€) 0.309 0.410 0.105 0.018 0.503
p⁠C (E€) 0.143 0.521 0.082 0.007 0.006
p⁠K(E€) 0.287 0.516 0.043 0.001 0.000
Δp⁠C/p⁠C (%) 0.508 0.342 0.108 0.005 0.000
Δp⁠K/p⁠K (%) 0.579 0.434 0.047 0.001 0.000
Yearly real consumption 0.654 0.738 0.119 0.032 0.000
Yearly real investments 0.018 0.521 0.051 0.001 0.000
Real consumption growth rate (%) 0.668 0.758 0.176 0.029 0.000
Real investments growth rate (%) 0.815 0.299 0.004 0.002 0.000
K⁠F 0.014 0.830 0.920 0.723 0.078
ΔK⁠F/K⁠F (%) 0.088 0.569 0.941 0.418 0.407
D⁠F (E€) 0.111 0.373 0.815 0.384 0.678
ΔD⁠F/D⁠F (%) 0.635 0.345 0.995 0.221 0.602
CB policy rate (%) 0.512 0.407 0.108 0.006 0.040
Government bond yield (%) 0.032 0.204 0.037 0.001 0.551
Government debt/GDP (%) 0.100 0.804 0.462 0.087 0.878
Government budget/GDP (%) 0.192 0.883 0.574 0.204 0.810
Feed-in tariff policy cost/GDP (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Feed-in tariff policy cost/Tax (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Oil import costs/GDP (%) 0.059 0.418 0.002 0.000 0.000
Electricity cost CGPs/GDP (%) 0.044 0.941 0.051 0.003 0.001
Table 4
p-Values of the two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test, under the null hypothesis that the two samples are selected from Populations having the same distribution. The test has been performed
for the unemployment rate variable for all the possible combinations of the no policy case and the feed-in tariff values. Values lower than 0.05 (0.01) signal that the null hypothesis is
rejected at the 5% (1%) significance level.
No policy 0.09 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
No policy 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.09 0.000 1.000 0.181 0.931 0.077 0.000 0.000
0.1 0.000 0.181 1.000 0.226 0.442 0.004 0.000
0.2 0.000 0.931 0.226 1.000 0.072 0.000 0.000
0.3 0.000 0.077 0.442 0.072 1.000 0.074 0.002
0.4 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.074 1.000 0.236
0.5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.236 1.000
Fig. 4 (a), with the result that real wages decrease when the feed-in
tariff increases. Therefore, higher consumption goods prices, lower real
wages as well as lower supply capacity by the CGPs (because of lower
employment rates) explain lower consumption levels in the economy.
Fig. 5 shows the substitution effect between investment and consump-
tion both in terms of average yearly levels (panel a and b) and in terms
of average yearly growth rates (panel c and d).
It is worth noting that all the above considerations about wages,
prices, consumption and investment, can be based both on the graph-
ical inspection of the boxplot figures and on the statistical tests re-
ported in Tables 2 and 3. In particular, the difference in the distribution
of theabove-mentioned variables between the no policy case and the
feed-in tariff scenarios is usually statistically significant for E€
with a few exceptions. The exceptions regard the consumption level and
its growth rates whose distribution is significantly different (lower) with
respect to the no policy case only for the highest feed-in tariff value.
This is an interesting outcome because the distribution is also signifi
cantly different (but with a higher median) with respect to the no policy
case also for relatively low , i.e. 0.1 E€ and 0.2 E€, as it is also evident
by looking at the bell shaped pattern we can observe in panel (a) and (c)
of Fig. 5. This suggests the possibility to attain a maximum value for the
consumption level/growth rate for a feed-in tariff value around 0.2 E€.
Fig. 7 shows how high feed-in tariffs impact interest rates and gov-
ernment finances. The central bank average interest rate increases at
higher due to the Taylor-rule response to higher consumption goods
prices, shown in Fig. 4panels(a) and (c). In particular, the rise of the CB
rate with respect to the no policy case is clearly statistically relevant (at
the 1% significance level) for E€, see Table 2, as also confirmed
by Table 3 where the statistics is reported with respect to the consecu-
tively lower values of the feed-in tariff.
Government finances are affected by the feed-in tariff in different
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Fig. 3. The Figure presents a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tariff considered and the no policy case, the distribution of the employment rate in the consumption
goods sector (a), the employment rate in the investment good sector (b), the unemployment rate (c) and the nominal wage level (d) over the 50 seeds of the simulation. The values in the
range represented by the boxplots refer to time averages over 20 years for each one of the 50 seeds.
by the introduction of the policy, with low or moderate intensity. This
statement is grounded on the graphical inspection of Fig. 7, panel (d),
where both the means and the medians of the government budget to
GDP ratio Monte Carlo distribution assume clearly higher values with
respect to the no policy case whenever the feed-in tariff is equal or lower
than 0.3 E€. Statistical tests confirm that this result is very significant
(at the 1% significance level) for E€, whereas less or no signif-
icance can be assessed at higher values of the feed-in tariff, see Table 2.
Our interpretation of this result is that the lower government deficit can
be explained by the previously discussed positive effects on the econ-
omy of the green policy. Better economic conditionsimply that, ceteris
paribus, tax revenues rise more than what would be necessary to finance
the feed-in tariff mechanism, given the Maastricht-like deficit target, at
least up to the point where the policy intensity is so high that its financ-
ing costs become a burden for the economy.
If we consider the distribution of the debt-to-GDP ratio, see Fig. 7,
panel (c), we can observe that the reduced government deficit at rela-
tively low feed-in tariffs, is also reflected in lower values of the median
of the debt-to-GDP ratioMonte Carlo distribution with respect to the no
policy case. In particular, according to the statistical tests reported in
Table 2, the difference is statistically significant for E€. This
latter result, combined with the bell shaped curve found for the con-
sumption level, see Fig. 5, panel (a) suggests that the application of the
green policy adopted can not only speed-up the transition to renewable
energy and reduce GHG emissions but also improve both economic per
formance and the sustainability of government finances, in particular,
for relatively low intensity of the policies.
The value of the feed-in tariff seems to have a more important and
statistically significant impact on the government bond yields. We argue
that the impact on bond yields for high values of the feed-in tariff, de-
pends both on the larger amount of government debt to be financed and
on the higher central bank interest rate for high ; the first factor im-
plies a higher supply of government bonds in the market, whereas the
second one implies that the government bond yields need to increase to
make debt instruments preferable as much as liquidity.
Fig. 8 reports the boxplots related to the feed-in tariff policy costs
with respect to both the nominal GDP (panel a) and the tax revenues
(panel b) as well as the oil import costs (panel c) and the overall costs
of electricity consumption (panel d), both with respect to nominal GDP.
The feed-in tariff policy cost, relative to GDP, clearly increases exponen-
tially with in line with the benefits we observe inpanels (a) and (b)
of Fig. 2; while the cost to GDP of oil import and electricity decrease at
high feed-in tariffs consistently with the evidence observed in Fig. 2 con-
cerning the decrease of the share of non-renewable electricity produc-
tion (panel b) and of electricity market price (panel c). It is worth noting
that, with the present calibration, the order of magnitude of oil import
costs (panel c) is much lower than the financing costs of the feed-in tar-
iff policy, being both costs reported with respect to nominal GDP; there-
fore, the economic benefits (lower imports) of the sustainability transi-
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Fig. 4. The Figure presents a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tariff considered and the no policy case, the distribution of the consumption goods price level,
p⁠C (a), the capital good price level, p⁠K (b), the yearly growth rate of the consumption goods price (c) and the yearly growth rate of the capital good price (d) over the 50 seeds of the
simulation. The values in the range represented by the boxplots refer to time averages over 20 years for each one of the 50 seeds.
Figures from (9) to (11) present three trajectories over time of rel-
evant variables. This different representation is aimed to provide an
understanding of dynamics over time of the Eurace economy. All the
three trajectories have been simulated by using the same seed and re-
fer to three different scenarios according to the value of , i.e. 0.09
(black-dotted line), 0.3 (blue-dashed line), and 0.5 (green continuous
line). We can observe that the dynamics of the share of renewable en-
ergy production capacity, reported in panel (b) of Fig. 9, is character-
ized by both big jumps and a relatively steady growth. In particular,
accordingly with the investment decision rule based on the NPV, see
Eq. (4), jumps occur whenever interest rates, reported in panel (d) of
Fig. 11, are very low or close to zero, see e.g. years 9 and 13 in the
blue-dashed line scenario and years 9, 15, 19 in the green continu-
ous-line one. Concerning economic variables, we observe an increasing
difference between the three scenarios, in particular in the second half
of the simulation time span, i.e. when the difference in the renewable
production capacity becomes relevant. The black-dotted line scenario
is affected by a severe endogenous crisis around year 11, see the un-
employment rate (Fig. 10a) and consumption (Fig. 11d,b), that causes a
huge reduction of investments. The crisis in the black-dotted line sce-
nario is so severe that causes a drop even in the productive capital
stock of firms, because of a very low investment rate combined with
the bankruptcy of many firms that stay out of production for months.
This crisis has also the effect of cooling down the dynamics of all rel-
evant prices, i.e. nominal wage (Fig. 10b), consumption and capital
goods prices (Fig. 11a and c). On the contrary, in the green continu-
ous line scenario investments are generally maintained at higher rates,
certainly also because of solar panel production, that helps to keep
the economy in good shape avoiding a prolonged unemployment crisis
fromyears 11 to 16, as in the black-dotted line scenario. The absence
of this big crisis in the green continuous line scenario is the cause of
steeper nominal wage dynamics in the second half of the simulation
time span (Fig. 10b) and, being wages the most relevant costs for both
capital and consumption goods producers, this in turn is the cause of
a higher increase of capital and consumption goods prices in the green
scenario (Fig. 11a and c)) in the second half of the simulation. Finally,
Fig. 11 shows the long-run trade-off between the production of invest-
ment goods (panel b), partly characterized by solar panels, and the one
of consumption goods (panel d), already observed in the previous box
plots, see Fig. 5. Moreover, Fig. 10c, shows that investments in renew-
able production capacity occurs to some extent also at the expense of
capital accumulation in the economy among consumption goods pro-
ducers, as the capital endowment of firms in the green continuous line
scenario is constantly lower than in the black-dotted line case and very
similar to the blue-dashed line scenario.
4. Concluding Remarks
This study presented a set of computational experiments based on
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Fig. 5. The Figure presents a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tariff considered and the no policy case, the distribution of the real consumption level (a), the real
investment level (b), the real consumption yearly growth rate (c) and the real investment yearly growth rate (d) over the 50 seeds of the simulation. The values in the range represented
by the boxplots refer to time averages over 20 years for each one of the 50 seeds.
race model has been enriched with new features to allow the investi-
gation of the transition towards a sustainable energy production para-
digm. The work focuses on a policy proposal aimed to foster the trans-
formation of the present economic system, where energy production is
mainly based on fossil-fuels, to an alternative one based on renewable
energy. In particular, we study the effectiveness and the impact on the
economy of a feed-in tariff policy aimed at incentivizing the production
of energy by means of a renewable source, e.g. solar energy. In this per-
spective, a new energy sector has been designed into the Eurace model,
by including an electricity market, power producers (renewable and fos-
sil-fuel based) and a more complete version of the capital goods pro-
ducer, which employslabor force to produce both investment goods for
firms and solar panels for the renewable power producer.
Computational results clearly show a significant impact of the
feed-in-tariff mechanism, which successfully incentivizes the production
of solar panels and increases the share of renewable energy consumed
in the Eurace economy. As for the impact on the economy, statistical tests
generally show a significant difference between the no policy scenario and
the scenarios with the policy, irrespective of its intensity, at least for rela-
tively low value of the feed-in tariff. In particular, we can observe a general
improvement of economic performance with respect to the no policy case,
considering both employment and consumption/investment levels. Further-
more, the costs of financing the transition to renewable energy does not af-
fect government finances, which actually improve for relatively low intensity
of the feed-in tariff policy. This is an important and positive result that
depends on the higher tax revenues following improved economic con-
ditions due to green investments. It is also worth noting that this out-
come was not obvious a priori, also considering that the fiscal costs of
the policy is much higher than the economic benefits of lower fossil fuel
import costs for the economy, according to a realistic calibration based
on the present fossil fuels import bill of an advanced economy. On the
other hand, for very high intensity of the policy, we observe an increasing
weight of the investment sector in the economy, due to the needed produc-
tion of solar units, which however is realized at the expense of the production
of consumption goods. This important outcome implies a reduced purchasing
power of consumption goods by households, and then lower living standards,
if measured only according to the perspective of a consumerist society. The
policy implications of our computational results are twofold: first, subsidizing
green investments in renewable energy production capacity has a significant
positive effect on the economy; second, there is an indication of a trade-off
between incentivizing investments in renewable energy and assuring high liv-
ing standards, measured in terms of consumption level, at relatively low in-
tensity of the policy. This latter result deserves to be further investigated as a
viable policy option in a democratic society, where it could be difficult for the
electorate to accept very strong policy measures, in particular at the begin-
ning of the transition, when the awareness about the need of climate change
mitigation is still not fully shared and widespread.
The crowding out of consumption by the investments sector is an
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Fig. 6. The Figure presents a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tariff considered and the no policy case, the distribution of the firms' aggregate capital stock, K⁠F
(a), the firms' aggregate capital stock yearly growth rate (b), the firms' aggregate debt, D⁠F (c) and the yearly growth rate of the firms' aggregate debt (d) over the 50 seeds of the simulation.
The values in the range represented by the boxplots refer to time averages over 20 years for each one of the 50 seeds.
particular considering the relative small weight that that photovoltaic
industry is expected to play in the economy. In this regard, it is worth to
point out again that the solar panel sector in our model should be con-
sidered as a representative of the whole renewable energy production
sector; moreover, investments in new solar panels shall be considered as
representative of all green investments. As a matter of fact, our design
of the renewable energy production technology, which is characterized
by huge capital costs and negligible variable costs, is compatible with
several renewable energy technologies for producing electricity, like so-
lar, hydropower, wind, and geothermal, to cite some of them. The main
point is that the RP agent employs physical capital units (solar panels,
wind turbines, hydropower turbines, geothermal power stations) in or-
der to produce electricity from a renewable source which is free. Under
this perspective, the RP agent in the model is quite generic and could
represent a wide range of technologies.
We also add that, according to the latest Frankfurt School-UNEP
Centre/BNEF Report⁠14 on “Global Trends in Renewable Energy Invest-
ment” (2017), global investments in new renewable energy production
capacity ranged from 200 from 300 billion US dollars in last few years.
However, different studies have pointed out that the size of investment
required each year in low carbon sectors to limit the temperature in-
crease to the two degree target should be much higher, i.e. in a range
14 http://fs-unep-centre.org/publications/
global-trends-renewable-energy-investment-2017.
from $650 billions to $1 trillion, see e.g. IEA (2012), WEF (2013). It is
worth noting that 1 trillion is around 2% of the world final consump-
tion expenditures, estimated at 55 trillion US dollars according to World
Bank statistics⁠15. On the other hand, from Fig. 5a we can observe that
the largest size of crowding out, measured as the difference between the
lowest (at = 0.2 E€) and the highest ( = 0.5 E€) median consump-
tion level is around 5%, which is a number consistent with the previous
2% number provided. The size of crowding out in the model shall then
be considered as a realistic figure to fully address the COP21 target.
Furthermore, we would like to emphasize that the trade-off between
consumption and investment is not a new result in the climate change
adaption and mitigation research domain. In this respect, it worth men-
tioning that one of the central forecast by Randers (2012) famous book
is a substantial increase in the fraction of GDP which will be required
for investments to cope with climate change.
In any case, it is worth noting that if factors like better employment
rates and the reduced GHG emissions are also taken into account, along
with reduced consumption, by an appropriate preference function, the
final outcome on well-being should be probably deemed asfavorable.
Future research will investigate and compare different policy op-
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Fig. 7. The Figure presents a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tariff considered and the no policy case, the distribution of the CB policy rate (a), the government
bond yield (b), both on a yearly basis, the government debt to GDP (c) and the government budget to GDP (d) over the 50 seeds of the simulation. The values in the range represented by
the boxplots refer to time averages over 20 years for each one of the 50 seeds.
attention to the issuing of green bonds and the adoption of targeted un-
conventional monetary policies, such as the green quantitative easing.
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Appendix A. Model Description
This appendix provides a compact model description that empha-
sizes the adopted stock-flow-consistentmodeling approach along the
lines introduced by Godley and Lavoie (2012) and common also within
post-Keynesian economics, see also Caverzasi and Godin (2015). The
following tables outline the stocks (balance sheet entries) and flows (in-
come statement entries) characterizing Eurace agents. A detailed de-
scription of agents' behavioural rules in the production and consump-
tion sectors is reported in Teglio et al. (2015), whereas Ozel et al.
(2016) describes the structural and behavioural features of the housing
market. Finally, it is worth noting that the stock-flow-consistentmod-
eling approach provides a set of relevant theoretical identities at the
agent, sector, and aggregate level, whose subsistence need to be nu
16 www.projectsymphony.eu
merically verified during the simulation, thus providing a very impor-
tant diagnostic and validation tool for the model and its implementa-
tion.
In the following, four tables (matrices) are presented showing:
• The agent class balance sheet (Table A1), i.e., the asset and liability
entries of each particular agent type;
• The sectorial balance sheet (Table A2), i.e., the assets and liabilities
aggregated over a sector (all agents belonging to the same class),
which sum to zero with their counterparts in other sectors;
• The cash flow matrix (Table A3), i.e. the monetary flows among sec-
tors, both in the current and capital account;
• The revaluation matrix (Table A4), which provides the information
about sectors' net worth (equity) changes between periods.
Table A1
Balance sheets of any agent class characterizing the Eurace economy. Balance sheet entries
in the table have a subscript character, that is the index of an agent in the class to which
the variable refers. In some cases, we can find two subscript characters, where the second
one refers to the index of an agent in another class where there is the balance-sheet coun-
terpart. For instance, D⁠f refers to the total debt of firm f, i.e. a liability, and ℒ⁠b refers to
the aggregate loans of bank b, i.e. an asset. ℓ⁠f,b (or ℓ⁠b,f) refer to the loans granted by banks
b to firms f. Of course, = ∑fℓb,f represents an aggregate balance sheet identity, that
is verified along the entire simulation. nEh,x represent the number of outstanding equity
shares of agents x held by households h. The market price of the equity shares is given by
pEx. The stock portfolio's value of household h is then computed as: ∑xnEh,xpEx. Government
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Fig. 8. The figure presents a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tariff considered and the no policy case, the distribution of the cost of the feed-in-tariff mechanism
to GDP (a), to tax revenues (b), oil import costs to GDP (c) and electricity cost of firm to GDP (d) over the 50 seeds of the simulation.The values in the range represented by the boxplots
refer to time averages over 20 years for each one of the 50 seeds.
Agent class Assets Liabilities
Household Liquidity: M⁠h Mortgages: U⁠h















Liquidity: M⁠f Debt: Df = ∑bℓf,b






Liquidity: M⁠K Equity: E⁠K
abbrev.: KGP Inventories: I⁠K
Power Pro-
ducer





Liquidity, M⁠RP Equity, E⁠RP
abbrev.: RP Solar panels, n⁠sp








Government Liquidity: M⁠G Outstanding government bonds
value: D⁠G = n⁠Gp⁠G
abbrev.: G Equity: E⁠G
Central Bank Liquidity: M⁠CB Outstanding fiat money: Fiat ⁠CB






Liquidity, M⁠FE Equity, E⁠FE
abbrev.: FE
It is worth noting that in the sectorial balance sheet (Table A2),
columns report the aggregated balance sheet of each sector, whereas
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Fig. 9. The Figure shows the number of solar panels installed (a), the share of the renewable energy (b), the oil amount consumed monthly by the PP (c) and the tax rate (d) during the
entire 20 years long simulation. The 3 different colors correspond to the 3 values of the guaranteed electricity price . In particular the black, blue, green lines represent
, respectively.
the liabilities (with minus sign) in one sector and the corresponding
claims, i.e. assets (with plus sign), in another sector, thus generally sum-
ming up to zero. Exceptions are: the capital goods accumulated by firms
and by the renewable power producer; inventories; housing units and
equity shares⁠17 owned by households.
Table A2
Sectorial balance sheet matrix. Subscripts represent the index of the agent or of the sector
(i.e. the set of all agents of the same class) to which the stock refers. Uppercase indexes are
used when the stock refers to the whole sector, e.g. F refers to the sector of all CGPs and
to the aggregate value of a particular stock in the sector, whereas lowercase subscripts are
used when it refers to the single agent (for instance in the case of sums). Finally, super-
script characters are introduced in the case of government bonds units n⁠G, i.e. and
, and Loans⁠B, i.e. and , because the balance sheet counterpart (in the asset
side) is hold by two sectors, i.e. households and central bank in the case of government
bonds units and consumption good producers and renewable power producer in the case
of loans.
17 We assume that equity shares in households' portfolio do not sum up to zero with
the corresponding equity counterpart in the issuer balance sheet because of the usual
difference between market price and book value.
Sectors
Non-Financial Private Agents (NFPAs) Banks Policy Makers Σ
HHs CGPs KGP PP RP Bs G CB
Tangible Capi-
tal
+X⁠Hp⁠X +K⁠Fp⁠K +n⁠spp⁠sp +X⁠hp⁠X +K⁠Fp⁠K +n⁠spp⁠sp
Inventories +I⁠Fp⁠C +I⁠Kp⁠K +I⁠Fp⁠C +I⁠Kp⁠K
Debt(−) /
Credit(+)




NFPA +M⁠H +M⁠F +M⁠K +M⁠PP +M⁠RP -D⁠B 0
Banks/Gov +M⁠B +M⁠G - D⁠CB 0
Central Bank +M⁠CB –Fiat⁠CB +M⁠CB,0




+ –E⁠F +ΣfnEfpEf − EF
+nEkpEk –E⁠K +nEkpEk − EK
+nEPPpEPP –E⁠PP nEPPpEPP − EPP
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Fig. 10. The Figure shows the unemployment rate (%) (a), the average nominal wage level (b), the firms' aggregate capital stock (c) and the CB policy rate (%) (d) during the entire
20 years long simulation. The 3 different colours correspond to the 3 values of the guaranteed electricity price . In particular the black, blue, green lines represent ,
respectively.
+ΣbnEbpEb –E⁠B +ΣbnEbpEb − EB
–E⁠H –E⁠G E⁠CB −E⁠H − E⁠G − E⁠CB
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Furthermore, in the last column of the sectorial balance sheet (Table
A2), the difference between central bank liquidity (an asset) and central
bank fiat money (a liability) is named M⁠CB,0, to emphasize that this dif-
ference is equal to the initial central bank liquidity and then is constant
over the simulation. Fiat money is the money created by the central
bank to provide loans to commercial banks, when they are in liquidity
shortage, or to buy government bonds in the secondary market, through
quantitative easing operations. Households, that sell government bonds
to the central bank, deposit the sale proceeds at their own banks, while
the money lend to banks by the central bank is lent to households or
firms, then in turn deposited again in the banking sector. Therefore, in
both cases, the liquidity of the banking sector is increased by an amount
equal to the new Fiat money created. Banks deposit their liquidity at the
central bank, then increasing its liquidity by an amount always equal to
the Fiat money originally created. It is worth noting however that the
money supply in the economy can variate independently from the fiat
money created by the central bank, because it endogenously raises every
time a bank grants a new loan or mortgage and it decreases when the
loan or mortgage is paid back.
Furthermore, the monetary flows among sectors are presented in
the cash flow matrix (Table A3), where the current account reports ag
gregate revenues (plus sign) and payments (minus sign) among sec-
tors, therefore summing to zero along the rows. The capital account re-
ports the endogenous money creation/destruction operations by means
of borrowing/debt repayment by private agents with banks as well as
fiat money creation/destruction by the central bank by means of the
standing facility with banks or government bonds purchase (quantita-
tive easing). These operations, along with the current account net cash
flows, determines the liquidity change of a sector.
Finally, the revaluation matrix (Table A4) provides the information
about changes in sectors' net worth (equity) between periods. In partic-
ular, agents' net worth dynamics depends on net cash flows in the cur-
rent account, physical capital depreciation and price changes in finan-
cial (stocks and bonds) and real (housing units, capital goods and inven-
tories of consumption goods) assets.
Table A3
Sectorial transaction flow matrix of agents populating the EURACE economy. Note that
HH stands fo Households, CGP stands for Consumption Goods Producer, KGP stands for
Capital Goods Producer, PP stands for Power Producer, Gov stands for Government and
CB stands for Central Bank.
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Electric-
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Fig. 11. The Figure shows the capital good price (a), the real investment (b), the consumption goods price (c) and the real consumption (d) during the entire 20 years long simulation.
The 3 different colours correspond to the 3 values of the guaranteed electricity price . In particular the black, blue, green lines represent , respectively.
Oil – + 0
Wages + – – – 0
Transfers + – 0
Taxes – – – – – + 0
Dividends + – – – – 0

















= = = = = = = = =
Net cash
flow





+Savings +Profits +Profits +Profits +Profits +Profits +Surplus +Seignoirage +Surplus 0
Δ Loans +ΔD⁠F –ΔD⁠F –Δℒ⁠CB 0
+ℒ⁠CB


















–Δ M⁠B –Δ M⁠G +Δ D⁠CB 0
Δ CB Liquid-
ity / Δ Fiat
Money
0
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Table A4
Sectorial revaluation matrix. The matrix provides information about changes in sectors'
net worth (equity) between periods. Net worth changes depend on net cash flows in the
current account, physical capital depreciation (at rate ξ⁠K) and price changes in real and
financial assets. It is worth noting that net worth of the issuers of financial assets (firms
and the government) are not subject to asset price changes.
HHs CGPs KGP PP RP Bs G CB FE Σ
Equity⁠t −1 E⁠H,t −1 E⁠F,t −1 E⁠K,t −1 E⁠PP,t −1 E⁠RP,t −1 E⁠B,t −1 E⁠G,t −1 E⁠CB,t −1 E⁠FE,t −1 E⁠TOT,t −1
Net cash
flow










+Σ⁠fI⁠fΔp⁠c +I⁠KΔp⁠K +Σ⁠fI⁠fΔp⁠c +I⁠KΔp⁠K
Equity
shares
Bonds + + + +
= = = = = = = = = =
Equity E⁠H,t E⁠F,t E⁠K,t E⁠PP,t E⁠RP,t E⁠B,t E⁠G,t E⁠CB,t E⁠FE,t E⁠TOT,t
Appendix B. Stylized Facts and Robustness Check
This appendix is composed of three sections. In section Appendix B.1
we present some basic stylized facts that are matched by the model.
Then we test the robustness of our analysis with respect to some key pa-
rameters. In particular, in section Appendix B.2 we show how oil price
variations impact some of the key variables in the model. In section Ap-
pendix B.3 we show how monetary policy can affect the results obtained
in the previous sections.
B.1. Stylized Facts
We present in this section a brief analysis of some main stylized facts
that can be found for instance in Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017) and
Napoletano et al. (2006).
Making reference to Table C2, showing the coefficient of variation
of the main economic indicators of the model, we remark here that the
volatility of investments is higher than volatility of consumption, as ex-
pected.
Moreover, Table B1 presents the correlation structure of the real
GDP. We observe that GDP is positively correlated with investments and
consumption, while it is anti-correlated with the unemployment rate.
GDP also shows a positive correlation with mortgages to households and
loans to firms, which lead the business cycle expansion. Also monetary
indicators, such as firms liquidity, are correlated to GDP and tend to
lead the business cycle expansion. Prices are countercyclical. This re-
sults are in line with stylized facts on the credit cycle (see for instance
Cappiello et al., 2010).
Finally, panel (a) of Fig. B1 shows the relationship generated by the
model between unemployment rate and GDP yearly variations (Okun
law), whereas panel (b) shows the relationship between yearly unem-
ployment and inflation rates (Phillips curve). Both curves are in line
with the empirical evidence (see Ball et al., 2013; Fitzgerald et al., 2013
for more details).
Table B1
Cross-correlation with real GDP of the main financial variables in the case . Stan-
dard errors of Monte Carlo simulations in parentheses. The significative values out of the
confidence bounds are indicated by an *.)
Filtered
series t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Real GDP 0.0617 0.2825* 0.5226* 0.7762* 1.0000* 0.7762* 0.5226* 0.2825* 0.0617
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0058) (0.0045) (0.0000) (0.0045) (0.0058) (0.0064) (0.0065)
Real con-
sumption
0.0779 0.2373* 0.4239* 0.6667* 0.8581* 0.8324* 0.6357* 0.4009* 0.1463*
(0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0064) (0.0050) (0.0031) (0.0041) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0066)
Real in-
vestment
0.0093 0.2066* 0.4009* 0.5419* 0.6978* 0.3101* 0.1034 −0.0239 −0.0867
(0.0088) (0.0103) (0.0107) (0.0085) (0.0050) (0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0074) (0.0071)
Firms liq-
uidity
−0.2889* −0.2267* −0.1538* −0.0025 0.0603 0.1934* 0.3405* 0.4323* 0.4575*
(0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0106) (0.0102) (0.0108)
Mort-
gages
−0.1399* −0.1151 −0.0685 −0.0176 0.0761 0.1609* 0.2399* 0.2996* 0.3343*
(0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0123) (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0117)
Loans −0.5333* −0.4792* −0.3606* −0.1568* 0.0603 0.2793* 0.4304* 0.5006* 0.5088*
(0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0102) (0.0094) (0.0088) (0.0092)
Unem-
ployment
0.0830 −0.0004 −0.0974 −0.2279* −0.3285* −0.4019* −0.4279* −0.4034* −0.3255*
(0.0097) (0.0101) (0.0099) (0.0090) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0080) (0.0074)
Price
level p⁠C
−0.0769 −0.0684 −0.0789 −0.1215 −0.1960* −0.1911* −0.1625* −0.1178 −0.0770
(0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0143) (0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0146)
Fig. B1. The Figure presents the Okun law (a) and the Phillips curve (b). Fit: -0.86 (a),
Fit:-0.38 (b).
B.2. The Oil Price
Fig. B2 shows the impact of the oil price on electricity prices,
consumption, investments and unemployment rate. We study two ad-
ditional cases with respect to the original one, where oil price is
p⁠0 = 0.0035. The first case corresponds to an increase of 40% in the oil
price (p⁠0 = 0.0049), whereas the second one corresponds to a decrease
in the price of 40% (p⁠0 = 0.0021).
Looking at Fig. B2, we can make some remark. First, the electricity
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the trends of the main variables of the model are similar for the differ-
ent values of the oil price. In particular the trade-off between consump-
tion and investments, observed for the original values of the oil price
of p⁠0 = 0.0035, is still valid for higher and lower oil prices. Third, a
higher oil price affects negatively the economic performance, triggering
a lower level of consumption and a higher unemployment rate.
Interestingly, the unemployment gap between a higher and a lower
oil price, is larger when there is no feed-in tariff but it becomes smaller
for growing feed-in tariffs. This result suggests that the feed-in tariff pol-
icy is particularly efficient when the oil price is high enough to generate
an important supply driven contraction of the economic activity.
Fig. B2. The Figure shows the electricity cost of firm to GDP (a), the real consumption
level (b), the real investment level (c) and the unemployment rate (%) (d) over the 50
seeds of the simulation. The values in the range represented by the boxplots refer to time
averages over 20 years for each one of the 50 seeds. The 3 different colors correspond to
the 3 values of the imported oil price p⁠O. In particular the black, blue, red lines represent
p⁠O = 0.0021,0.0035,0.0049, respectively. p⁠O = 0.0035 is the value used for the main re-
sults of the paper.
B.3. The Parameters of the Taylor Rule
Fig. B3. The Figure shows CB policy rate (%) (a), inflation (b), real consumption level (c),
real investment level (d), unemployment rate (%) (e) and the share of renewable energy
(f) over the 50 seeds of the simulation. The values in the range represented by the boxplots
refer to time averages over 20 years for each one of the 50 seeds. A different weight a⁠u of
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). The considered a⁠u values are 0 (black), 0.2 (blue)
and 0.4 (red). a⁠u = 0.2 is the value used for the main results of the paper.
We remind here that the central bank agent in the model uses an
dual mandate Taylor rule, targeting inflation and unemployment rate,
in order to set the interest rate
In this section, we try to analyze the impact of different policy set-
tings on the results presented in the main part of the paper. In particu-
lar, we want to understand how much the crowding-out effect depends
on the parameters governing the central bank policy rule. Therefore, we
run two additional set of experiments where we change the value of
the unemployment targeting parameter a⁠u. With respect to the baseline
value of this parameter in the paper (a⁠u = 0.2), we increase it to 0.4 and
we decrease it to 0. This means that, when a⁠u = 0, the central bank does
not operate any more with dual mandate rule and only targets inflation,
while in the other case (of a⁠u = 0.4), the weight of the unemployment
rate in the Taylor rule is even higher. Results are shown in Fig. B3.
When the purely inflation targeting policy is active (the black boxes
in the plots), the central banks sets a higher interest rate, which is be-
tween four and five percent. In this case, the central bank does certainly
a better job in achieving its target inflation objective of 2% (pi⁠t = 2 in
the model). When the monetary policy of the central bank considers the
unemployment rate, the interest rate is higher and the 2% inflation tar-
get is not reached. On the other hand, the policy is very effective in re-
ducing the unemployment level from an average above 10%, in the case
of a⁠u = 0, to an average below 4%, in the case of not purely inflation
targeting rules. It is also worth noting the high volatility in the case of
a⁠u = 0, which indicates the presence of more extreme cases across the
different seeds, where the average unemployment level can reach very
high values, clearly indicating more instability and a higher probability
of incurring in economic crises.
It is also interesting to notice that the crowding out effect between
consumption and investments, for growing values of the feed-in tariff, is
softened in the case of a⁠u = 0. Therefore, the feed-in tariff policy seems
to be less effective in the case of economies in recession, as shown also
be the lower share of renewable energy in panel (f).
Appendix C. Averages and Standard Errors of the Monte Carlo
Distributions
This appendix reports the averages and standard errors of the Mon-
tecarlo distributions along with the related coefficients of variation of
the 28 main economic variables considered in the paper.
Table C1
Monte Carlo averages (standard errors in round brackets) over 50 seeds. For each seed
(simulation), the time average over the entire twenty-years time span is considered.









































82.71(0.26) 82.25(0.27) 81.41(0.22) 80.25(0.20)
Employment
rate KGP (%) 13.52 (0.23) 14.12 (0.19) 13.61 (0.21) 13.77(0.24) 14.48(0.24) 15.55(0.20) 16.91(0.19)
Unemployment
rate (%)
4.72 (0.17) 3.49 (0.08) 3.42 (0.11) 3.52(0.10) 3.27(0.10) 3.04(0.08) 2.84(0.06)
Nominal wage
(E€)
2.57 (0.03) 2.67 (0.02) 2.64 (0.02) 2.61(0.02) 2.67(0.02) 2.75(0.02) 2.77(0.02)
p⁠C (E€) 1.12 (0.01) 1.16 (0.01) 1.15 (0.01) 1.14(0.01) 1.17(0.01) 1.20(0.01) 1.24(0.01)
p⁠K(E€) 5.98 (0.06) 6.26 (0.05) 6.20 (0.05) 6.14(0.06) 6.31(0.06) 6.57(0.04) 6.79(0.04)
Δp⁠C/p⁠C (%) 5.29 (0.12) 5.80 (0.10) 5.73 (0.11) 5.53(0.12) 5.83(0.11) 6.23(0.09) 6.63(0.07)
Δp⁠K/p⁠K (%) 5.92 (0.11) 6.48 (0.10) 6.41 (0.11) 6.25(0.12) 6.59(0.11) 7.11(0.08) 7.58(0.07)
Yearly real con-
sumption
108016 (403) 109448 (323) 109663 (409) 109838(390) 108859(417) 107699(360) 105411(309)
Yearly real in-
vestments





















1007934(4196) 1008018(4295) 1010133(3966) 999940(3552)





236257(1053) 236650(1338) 235317(1452) 230665(1227)
ΔD⁠F/D⁠F (%) −0.51 (0.17) 3.89 (0.05) 3.92 (0.06) 3.85(0.06) 3.88(0.07) 3.79(0.08) 3.61(0.07)
CB policy rate
(%)
3.63 (0.07) 3.86 (0.07) 3.90 (0.07) 3.83(0.08) 3.99(0.07) 4.24(0.05) 4.44(0.06)
Government
bond yield (%)
6.04 (0.16) 5.93 (0.18) 6.28 (0.17) 6.04(0.18) 6.41(0.19) 7.22(0.23) 7.59(0.29)
Government
debt/GDP (%)














0.0 (0.0) 0.223 (0.001) 0.271 (0.002) 0.92(0.01) 2.05(0.05) 3.89(0.08) 7.37(0.14)
Oil import
costs/GDP (%)
0.84 (0.01) 0.814 (0.006) 0.82 (0.01) 0.82(0.01) 0.79(0.01) 0.751(0.004) 0.704(0.003)
Electricity cost
CGPs/GDP (%)
0.94 (0.01) 0.914 (0.006) 0.93 (0.01) 0.93(0.01) 0.91(0.01) 0.88(0.01) 0.853(0.004)
In particular, Table C1 reports the value of the mean of the distrib-
ution, along with the standard error (in round bracket). This table pro-
vides a more compact information with respect to the one provided by
boxplots, see Figures from 2 to 8, and discussed in details in the re-
sults section along with the related statistical tests. Table C2 reports the
average over the 50 seeds of the coefficient of variation, for each 28
economic variables examined and all the policies considered. For each
seed the coefficient of variation is computed as the ratio between the
standard deviation and the mean, both over time. From the table we
can observe a clear decrease, for increasing values of the feed-in tar-
iff, of the relative variability of the investment level and of the em-
ployment rate in the capital goods sector. This outcome is consistent
with the bias toward an increasing level of investments in renewable
energy production capacity determined by the rising feed-in tariff. On
the other hand, in most of the other cases, the direction of change of
the coefficient of variation with respect to the feed-in tariff does not ex-
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ables, the value seems independent from the policy, while for others,
like the unemployment rate and the central bank interest rate we can
observe an increasing relative variability with the strengthening of the
policy.
Table C2
Coefficients of variation averaged over the 50 seeds. For each seed the coefficient of vari-
ation is computed as the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean, both over
time. The letters “n.a.” stand for “not available” due to a zero by zero division because
there are no policy costs in the no policy case.
Variables
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